

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 06191 01 OF 02 222230Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 /026 W
-----043453 222238Z /61
P R 221924Z JUL 77
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9590
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 6191

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF JULY 22, 1977
(SALT TWO-1299)

THE FOLLOWING IS A STATMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF JULY 22, 1977.

SEMENOV STATEMENT, JULY 22, 1977

I

AS A RESULT OF THOROUGH AND VERY LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS,
AND BASED ON THE ACTUAL EXPERIENCE OF COMPLYING WITH THE
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT,
WHICH HAVE BEEN IN EFFECT FOR FIVE YEARS, AND IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED BETWEEN OUR STATES, THE SIDES
HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT FOR THE PURPOSE OF
PROVIDING ASSURANCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF
THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, EACH SIDE SHALL USE NATIONAL
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 06191 01 OF 02 222230Z

TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION AT ITS DISPOSAL IN A MANNER
CONSISTENT WITH GENERALLY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW. THE UNDERSTANDING ON THIS SCORE IS RECORDED IN THE AGREED
ARTICLE XVI OF THE DRAFT WHICH WAS CONFIRMED AGAIN IN THE
COURSE OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS AT THE LEVEL OF
FOREIGN MINISTER, IN GENEVA IN MAY 1977.

AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS IS ALSO TO BE PLAYED BY THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION WHICH IS BEING GIVEN APPROPRIATE FUNCTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, AND WHICH HAS SOUND POSITIVE EXPERIENCE IN MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEASURES AGREED UPON BETWEEN OUR STATES IN THE FILED OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION.

I MUST SAY THAT THE SOVIET SIDE ATTACHES FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO QUESTIONS OF VERIFICATION, BECAUSE PRECISE KNOWLEDGE, PROVIDED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED ARE BEING COMPLETED WITH IS NECESSARY FOR ENSURING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND VIABILITY OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

IN THE COURSE OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS THE SIDES HAVE DONE A GREAT DEAL OF WORK TO REACH AGREEMENT ON JOINT PROVISIONS FOR INCLUSION IN THE DRAFT TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT THESE PROVISIONS, RECORDED IN THE JUNE 10, 1977 TEXT THE DELEGATIONS HAVE AT THEIR DISPOSAL, FULLY MEET THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED ON STRATEGIC OFFENSEIVE ARMS MUST BE SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

THUS, THERE IS A GOOD FOUNDATION FOR COMPLETING AGREEMENT ON OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 06191 01 OF 02 222230Z

EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY AND VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

PRECISELY THIS MUST BE THE BASIS FOR WORKING OUT THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, 3 AND 5--ON THE DEFINITIONS OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, HEAVY BOMBERS, AND LAUNCHERS OF MIRVED ICBMS AND SLBMS, WHICH HAVE A DIRECT BEARING ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE ESTABLISHED 2,400 AND 1,320 MAXIMUM LEVELS, AS WELL AS OTHER PROVISIONS.

IT IS CLEAR THAT, WITH DUE CONSIDERATION FOR THE TASK OF VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE SIDES BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, THE PROVISIONS BEING WORKED OUT MUST ENSURE THAT ALL THE ARMS OF THE SIDES WHICH ARE ACTUALLY SUBJECT TO BEING COUNTED WITHIN THESE LEVELS ARE COUNTED THEREIN. AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY MUST BE SUCH AS TO PRECLUDE ANY POSSIBILITY OF ARBITRARILY INCLUDING IN THE AFOREMENTIONED AGGREGATE NUMBERS ARMS WHICH ARE IN FACT NOT LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, HEAVY BOMBERS OR LAUNCHERS OF MIRVED ICBMS AND SLBM, RESPECTIVELY.

AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, BOTH SIDES ARE EQUALLY--AND I

REPEAT, EQUALLY--INTERESTED IN THIS. AND THIS PRECISELY
IS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PROPOSALS OF THE USSR ON THESE
QUESTIONS.

MR. AMBASSADOR, BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN OUR STATES,
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS ARE THAT INSTRUMENT THE USE OF WHICH
ENABLES THE SIDES TO ENSURE, ADEQUATELY AND WITH AN ACCOUNT
FOR THE SPECIAL NATURE OF THE SUBJECT OF LIMITATIONS, THAT
THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT ARE VERIFIABLE.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 06191 02 OF 02 222236Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 /026 W

-----043528 222241Z /61

P R 221924Z JUL 77

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9591

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 GENEVA 6191

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

IN THIS CONNECTION, THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AT
THE DISPOSAL OF THE SIDES ARE FULLY CAPABLE OF PROVIDING THE
INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR THE SIDES TO BE CONFIDENT THAT
THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED ON STRATEGIC OFFENSEVE
ARMS ARE STRICLY COMPLIED WITH.

VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS IS NOT SOME
SORT OF SPORADIC ACTION, BUT RATHER A TOTALITY OF MEASURES
CARRIED OUT SYSTEMATICALLY AND OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME.

MOREOVER, UNDER THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XVI
THE SIDES ASSUME OBLIGATIONS WHICH ENSURE UNHINDERED OPERA-
TION OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS IN CARRYING OUT THEIR TASKS
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT.

VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE
WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT HAS A CLEAR-CUT PURPOSE--SUBJECT TO

VERIFICATION ARE THE SPECIFIC AND CLEARLY DELINEATED OBLIGATIONS OF THE SIDES. THE SCOPE OF THESE OBLIGATIONS UNAMBIGUOUSLY DETERMINES THE FRAMEWORK OF THE INFORMATION THAT IS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 06191 02 OF 02 222236Z

NECESSARY AND, AT THE SAME TIME, SUFFICIENT FOR ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

ANY ATTEMPT--UNDER WHATEVER PRETEXT--TO GO BEYOND THIS FRAMEWORK WOULD BE TOTALLY INADMISSIBLE AND MUST BE RESOLUTELY REJECTED. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE, THE PROPOSAL, FOR EXAMPLE, TO RECORD AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE NUMERICAL VALUES FOR THE LAUNCH-WEIGHT AND THROW-WEIGHT OF LIGHT AND HEAVY ICBMS DOES NOT IN ANY WAY ENSUE FROM THE MEANING AND SCOPE OF THOSE OBLIGATIONS WHICH WILL BE ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT. IT ONLY COMPLICATES THE NEGOTIATIONS NEEDLESSLY AND CAN CAUSE THEM TO BOG DOWN.

AS ALREADY NOTED HERE, ARTICLE XVI OCCUPIES AN IMPORTANT PLACE IN THE JOINT DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

PARS. 1 AND 2 OF THIS ARTICLE HAVE BEEN AGREED. AS FOR AGREEING ON THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XVI, PAR. 3, WE HAVE SET FORTH THE APPROACH OF THE SOVIET SIDE REPEATEDLY AND IN DETAIL, AT THE MEETINGS OF JUNE 3, 10 AND 29 AND OF JULY 8, 1977 AMONG OTHERS.

THE OBLIGATION CONTAINED IN PAR. 3 OF THAT ARTICLE, NOT TO USE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES, DOES NOT REQUIRE CHANGES IN CURRENT CONSTRUCTION, ASSEMBLY, CONVERSION OR OVERHAUL PRACTICES, NOR IN CURRENT TESTING PRACTICES. THUS, THERE IS SIMPLY NO MENTION HERE OF ANY KIND OF "EXEMPTION" FROM THE BAN ON DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES.

AT THE JUNE 3, 1977 MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED, TABLED THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET SIDE NOT TO USE MEASURES AIMED AT CONCEALING
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 06191 02 OF 02 222236Z

THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN ICBMS AND THEIR LAUNCHERS DURING TESTING. WE SEE NOTHING THAT COULD HAMPER CONSTRUCTIVE CONSIDERATION OF THIS INITIATIVE OF THE SOVIET SIDE.

AS FOR METHODS OF TRANSMITTING TELEMETRIC INFORMATION DURING TESTING, THEY ARE PART OF THE PURELY INTERNAL TECHNOLO-

GICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE SIDES AND ARE NOT DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES.

THE CONSIDERATIONS SET FORTH IN OUR STATEMENT TODAY MERIT VERY CAREFUL STUDY.

II

MAR AMBASSADOR,

THE DRAFTING GROUP HAS WORKED ON REACHING AGREEMENT ON SPECIFIC PROVISIONS FOR INCLUSION IN ARTICLE VI OF THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT. AS A RESULT OF THIS WORK, ADDITIONAL AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON SOME NEW PROVISIONS OF THAT ARTICLE, AS WELL AS ON AN AGREED STATEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLES VI AND XVII. THE USSR DELEGATION TAKES NOTE OF THIS PROGRESS.

EARLE

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SPEECHES, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 22-Jul-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977GENEVA06191
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770262-1130
Format: TEL
From: GENEVA USSALTTWO
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770730/aaaaazna.tel
Line Count: 242
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 03d55b65-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 22-Apr-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1781709
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF JULY 22, 1977 (SALT TWO-1299) THE FOLLOWING IS A STATMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MI
TAGS: PARM, (SEMENOV)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/03d55b65-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009